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MUNICIPAL BLIGHT DECLARATIONS
Today most of America's large cities contain declining residential
and commercial neighborhoods in need of redevelopment.1 Espe-
cially in older cities, economically strapped local governments can do
little more than watch tax bases decline and crime rates rise, while
private developers migrate to surburban areas boasting increasing
populations and lower land and development costs.2
These neighborhoods suffer from "blight," a term describing any
area undergoing a process of deterioration, usually characterized by
substandard housing, abandoned structures, and underutilization of
properties.' Municipal efforts toward improvement have created
conflicts between redevelopment forces pushing for large scale con-
demnation and demolition in the name of the public good, and prop-
erty owners whose individual interests suffer as a result.
4
1. The deterioration of America's urban cores has long been recognized as a seri-
ous and worsening problem and has inspired prolific commentary. See, e.g., R. FuT-
TERMAN, THE FUTURE OF OUR CITIES (1961); V. GRUEN, THE HEART OF OUR CITIES
(1964); Cook, The Battle Against Blight, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 444 (1960); Mandelker,
Public Purpose in Urban Redeyelopment, 28 TUL. L. REV. 96 (1953).
2. "'[P]opulation growth in metropolitan areas continued to be overwhelmingly
concentrated in the suburbs. This trend was first observed in the 'thirties, and it con-
tinued throughout the 'forties and 'fifties. During the 'sixties suburban population
grew at a rate of five times that of the central city." Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, Population Characteristics: Central City Trends and Sub-
urban Comparisons, 1960-1970, in SUBURBANIZATION DYNAMICS AND THE FUTURE
OF THE CITY 55 (J. Hughes ed. 1974).
This rapid out-migration from urban areas has left many cities caught in a down-
ward economic spiral.
Institutionally distressed cities are burdened with physical infrastructures in need
of repair and servicing. The lack of fiscal capability among some cities to main-
tain, and where necessary to expand, infrastructure has led to a loss of jobs and
population, resulting in further erosion of their tax bases and their fiscal vitality.
Weinstein & Clark, The Fiscal Outlook for Growing Cities, in URBAN GOVERNMENT
FINANCE 105, 112 (R. Bahl ed. 1981).
3. Cook, The Battle Against Blight, 43 MARQ. L. REV. 444, 445-46 (1960).
4. Observers have long realized that urban redevelopment necessitates broad re-
medial action. As the Supreme Court observed in the landmark case of Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954), "If owner after owner were permitted to resist these
redevelopment programs on the ground that his particular property was not being
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Redevelopment statutes in many states permit municipal legisla-
tures to declare urban areas blighted, opening the door for public
redevelopment agencies to condemn the property and sell or lease the
land to private developers at attractive rates.' This process stimulates
private investment in public redevelopment. Opponents have chal-
lenged these statutes on their face as public subsidies to private devel-
opers.6 Alternatively, owners of profitable enterprises within the
designated area have disputed the authority of the municipality to
declare their property blighted simply because surrounding proper-
ties suffer from disrepair.7 This section examines the current state of
these redevelopment controversies.
I. FACIAL ATTACKS
The most broadly based attacks on redevelopment legislation focus
on the statutes' constitutionality. Challengers argue that by con-
demning private property for resale to-and development by-pri-
vate, profit seeking parties, municipal redevelopment agencies are
misusing their delegated powers of eminent domain.
The United States Supreme Court heard these charges in Berman v.
Parker.' The plaintiffs in Berman challenged the authority of the
District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency to take land
through condemnation in order to sell or lease parcels to private en-
terprise.9 Public takings resulting in private profit, they argued, vio-
lated the fifth amendment's mandate that the government condemn
property only for a public purpose.' 0 Justice Douglas, writing for a
unanimous Court, stated emphatically that a city may validly con-
sider the cleanup of depressed and unattractive areas a public pur-
pose.'1 If the end is valid, the Court concluded, the mere fact that the
used against the public interest, integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer
greatly."
5. Eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 671/2 § 64 (Smith-Hurd 1967); MiNN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 462.415-21 (West 1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-31-1, 45-31-5 (1980).
6. See note 13 infra.
7. See notes 39-54 infra.
8. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
9. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-701 to -719 (1951) (current version at D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 5-801 to -840 (1981)).
10. "No person shall... be deprived of. . .property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONsT. amend V.
11. Justice Douglas noted that the legislature rather than the courts serves as the
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legislature chose private enterprise as the means will not invalidate
the condemnation. 2
After Berman's unambiguous approval of public/private coopera-
tion for urban redevelopment under the federal constitution, property
owners have turned toward eminent domain provisions in state con-
stitutions for help, generally without success. 3 Missouri's experience
with redevelopment legislation is in many ways representative of re-
cent litigation. Chapter 353 of the Missouri Code 14 provides one of
the nation's most innovative redevelopment schemes. Chapter 353
authorizes a municipal legislature to declare as "blighted" a parcel,
block, or an entire neighborhood of city land.15 The city then re-
views proposals for redevelopment and approves a detailed develop-
ment plan for the area, chartering the developer as a redevelopment
"main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation," 348 U.S. at 32.
In an impassioned statement Justice Douglas urged the cities to halt the spread of
inferior housing conditions.
[Inadequate housing conditions] may .. suffocate the spirit by reducing the
people who live there to the status of cattle. They may indeed make living an
almost insufferable burden. They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the com-
munity which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men turn.
The misery of housing may despoil a community as an open sewer may ruin a
river.
Id. at 32-33.
Finally, he broadened the holding to include the promotion of beauty, as well as
sanitation, as an admirable municipal objective. Id. at 33.
12. id.
13. As early as 1954, of the 17 states whose courts had considered the constitution-
ality of condemnations by private redevelopment corporations, only Georgia and
Florida held the program unconstitutional. Housing Auth. v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560,
74 S.E.2d 891 (1953); State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952). See
Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth., 364 Mo. 974, 985, 270 S.W.2d
44, 49-50 (1954). Since then, the trend has continued virtually unabated. See gener-
ally, Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1414 (Supp. 1981). In a recently decided case, the Michigan
Supreme Court held that "alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic
base of the community" are valid public purposes justifying the use of eminent do-
main even where property was not alleged to be blighted. Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 634, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459 (1981).
14. Mo. REv. STAT. § 353 (1969).
15. Id. § 353.020(2):
"Blighted area" shall mean that portion of the city within which the legislative
authority of such city determines that by reason of age, obsolescence, inadequate
or outmoded design or physical deterioration, have become economic and social
liabilities, and that such conditions are conducive to ill health, transmission of
disease, crime or inability to pay reasonable taxes.
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corporation. 6 This designation permits the corporation itself to con-
demn land in the blighted area pursuant to the redevelopment plan,
without further municipal action.17 This authority expedites prop-
erty acquisition without possible hindrance from recalcitrant prop-
erty owners or real estate speculators."8 In addition, the statute
grants a tax abatement on property value increases above the fair
market value at the time of condemnation,' 9 thereby lowering owner-
ship costs and facilitating later sales to ultimate consumers.
Chapter 353 was challenged in Annbar v. Westside Redevelopment
Corp. 20 by two hotel owners seeking to prevent construction of a pro-
posed Hilton Hotel within a nearby redevelopment area.2 The
plaintiffs argued that the statute authorized a taking of private prop-
erty by a private corporation for private benefit22 in violation of the
state constitution's public purpose requirement in the exercise of emi-
nent domain.23 The Supreme Court of Missouri cited the express ap-
proval of urban redevelopment in Missouri's constitution2 4 and held
16. Id. § 353.060. This statute originally was limited in application to cities of
over 350,000 in population (St. Louis and Kansas City), but was amended in 1976 to
include all cities of 4,000 or more. Id. § 353.020(3) (1978). To date, however, only St.
Louis and Kansas City have applied the statute.
17. Id. § 353.060 (1969).
18. Despite the availability of the condemnation power, Missouri's redevelopment
corporations have used the power infrequently. Generally, the mere threat of its use
convinces the property's owner to ask for a reasonable price, thereby saving both
parties time and legal expenses. Interview with Eugene Kilgen, Executive Director,
Washington University Medical Center Redevelopment Corporation, in St. Louis
(June 2, 1981).
For a statistical analysis as to the extent property tax abatements make Chapter 353
properties more attractive to investors and more competitive in office space rentals,
see D. MANDELKER, G. FEDER & M. COLLINS, REVIVING CITIES WITH TAX ABATE-
MENT (1980) [hereinafter cited as REVIVING CITIES].
19. Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.110 (1969). The property's assessed value for purposes
of property taxation remains unchanged for 10 years after the date of purchase. For
the next 15 years, only half of the property's actual increase in value is taxed. Id.
20. 397 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1965).
I. Id. at 638.
22. Id.
23. Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 28.
24. Mo. CONST. art. 6, § 21 states in part:
Laws may be enacted. . . providing for the clearance, replanning, reconstruc-
tion, redevelopment and rehabitation of blighted, substandard or insanitary areas
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that the redevelopment served a primarily public purpose.2 5 Al-
though the use of condemnation could result in lower acquisition
costs and thereby a competitive advantage for the new hotel, the
court found the private benefit to be merely incidental to the overrid-
ing public benefit.26 Moreover, because the constitution does not
limit participation in redevelopment efforts to public agencies, the
court upheld the municipal delegation of its eminent domain power
to private parties.27 In an earlier decision,2" the court had upheld
Chapter 353 tax incentives for subsequent buyers of redeveloped
property,29 citing another redevelopment provision in Missouri's
constitution. 0
Armed with this judicial encouragement, developers increasingly
applied for and utilized municipal condemnation power directly,
finding no need to wait for public agency action.31 Investors brought
substantial capital into the heart of St. Louis, a city long plagued by
business ffight to the suburbs.3 2 As a result, the city has formally
adopted a planning commission recommendation to "blight" all of
downtown St. Louis. 3 For its part, the Missouri State Legislature
radically reduced municipal eligibility requirements for use of Chap-
ter 353.34 Several studies have shown that Missouri's Chapter 353
has significantly aided its cities in attracting investment capital and in
25, 397 S.W.2d at 646.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 647.
28. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth. v. City of St. Louis, 270 S.W.2d 58
(Mo. 1954).
29. Id. at 65.
30. Mo. CONST. art. 10, § 7 states in part:
For the purpose of encouraging. . . the reconstruction, redevelopment, and re-
habilitation of obsolete, decadent, or blighted areas, the general assembly by gen-
eral law may provide for such partial relief from taxation of the lands devoted to
any such purpose, and of the improvements thereon, by such method or methods,
for such period or periods of time, not exceeding twenty-five years in any in-
stance, and upon such terms, conditions and restrictions as it may prescribe.
31. REVIVING CITIES, supra note 18, at 73-74. Prior to these events, the Saint
Louis Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority was generally relied upon by
Chapter 353 corporations for acquisition and clearance of blighted land, and occa-
sionally received financial help for initial property acquisitions. Id. at 71-72.
32. See note 35 infra.
33. REVIVING CITIES, supra note 18, at 72 (citing St. Louis Plan Commission,
Blighting Study for Downtown (1980)).
34. See note 16 supra.
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the redevelopment of depressed areas.35
In some ways, however, judicial enthusiasm for Chapter 353's un-
conventional redevelopment methods may not be representative of
the reception such proposals would receive in other states. The
Alnnbar decision rested at least in part on unique provisions in Mis-
souri's Constitution explicitly encouraging both redevelopment ef-
forts36 and tax abatements.37 Absent such authority, judicial
approval of innovative redevelopment techniques could be less
assured.38
II. "As APPLIED" ATTACKS
Most challenges to redevelopment condemnation arise when prop-
erty owners claim the city has arbitrarily included their land within
the "blighted" area.39 Such claims have rarely been successful.
Courts generally accord great deference to municipal determinations
that a particular piece of property is in fact "blighted. 40 In addition,
courts will allow inclusion of concededly non-blighted property
where the legislature finds the inclusion necessary for effective rede-
35. See NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, LOCAL IN-
CENTIVES CAN WORK, THE ST. Louis EXPERIENCE, (Oct. 1980); M. Norman, Com-
munity Participation in Redevelopment Planning with Reference to the Washington
University Medical Center Redevelopment Project, (unpublished thesis, Department
of Urban Studies, Washington University, 1975); National League of Cities, Dollars
From Design (monograph to be published after April 1, 1982).
36. 397 S.W.2d at 647. On a broader foundation, however, the court also cited
Berman v. Parker, supra note 8, for devising effective means to redevelopment objec-
tives. Id at 647.
37. Id. at 653. See note 30 supra.
38. See Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis.2d 408, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967),
where the court held that partial tax exemptions for urban redevelopment corporation
property violated the uniformity provision in the state's constitution. See generally
REVIVING CITIEs, supra note 18, at 135-143 (analysis of the constitutionality of statu-
tory redevelopment provisions in Ohio, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, New York, Penn-
sylvania and New Jersey).
39. Eg., Parking Systems, Inc. v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment Corp.,
518 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1974) (property owner alleged that only 14% of project area was
occupied by substandard buildings); Leo Realty v. Redevelopment Auth. of Wilkes-
Barre, 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 288, 310 A.2d 149 (1974) (plaintiff's buildings were struc-
turally sound).
40. Maglies v. Planning Bd. of East Brunswick, 173 N.J. Super. 419, 414 A.2d 570
(1980) (credible evidence sufficient); Seattle v. Loutsis Inv. Co., 16 Wash. App. 158,
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velopment. 4' As the United States Supreme Court stated in Berman
v. Parker, "the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated
plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch."'42
State legislatures have been expanding municipal discretion by
providing broad and frequently amorphous definitions of what con-
stitutes "blight. 43 Missouri, for example, defines "blighted areas" as
those portions of the city which "have become economic and social
liabilities," 44 and such areas "may include buildings or improve-
ments not in themselves blighted."45 As a result of this permissive
attitude, both judicial and legislative, municipalities have success-
fully "blighted" areas lacking any structures resembling the tradi-
tional concept of slums,46 unimproved and open space areas,47 and
even areas containing profitable commercial enterprises.48
Surprisingly, California is the only state to retreat significantly
from granting expansive discretion to its municipalities. In Sweet-
water Valley Civic Association v. City of National City,49 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that plaintiffs marginally profitable golf
course was not a blighted area,' even under California's broad statu-
tory definition.51 The court held that it was insufficient for the city to
41. Hawley v. South Bend Dep't of Redevelopment, 383 N.E.2d 333 (Ind. 1978)
(fact that project area larger than specific parcels needed for shopping mall not a fatal
flaw); Maryland Plaza Redevelopment Corp. v. Greenberg, 594 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979) (area may be declared blighted even though it contains structures outside
the definition of blight).
42. 348 U.S. at 35-36.
43. See notes 44 & 51 infra.
44. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(2) (1969).
45. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(1) (1969).
46. Jersey City Chapter of the Property Owner's Protective Ass'n v. City Council,
55 N.J. 86, 259 A.2d 698 (1969) (redevelopment statute goes beyond removal of per-
ceptually offensive slums); Cannata v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 182 N.E.2d
395, 227 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1962) (finding of tangible physical blight unnecessary).
47. Cordova v. Tucson, 16 Ariz. App. 447, 494 P.2d 52 (1972) (land unimproved
except for buildings of historical significance); Pet Car Prods. v. Barnett, 150 Conn.
42, 184 A.2d 797 (1962) (plaintiff's property consisted partly of vacant or unimproved
land and partly of land with non-substandard structures located thereon).
48. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (department store); Schweig v. City of
St. Louis, 569 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (fashionable retail shopping area).
49. 18 Cal.3d 270, 555 P.2d 1099, 133 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1976).
50, Id. at 279, 555 P.2d at 1104, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
51. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030 (Deering) states in part that a finding
of blight requires that the area suffer "either social or economic liabilities, or both,
requiring redevelopment in the interest of the health, safety, and general welfare."
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show merely "that the area is not being put to its optimum use."52
Soon thereafter, apparently in response to speculative abuses, the
California legislature amended its redevelopment statute to require a
stronger showing that the inclusion of a non-blighted, non-contigu-
ous area was necessary for effective redevelopment. 3 Presently, few
states seem to be following California's conservative trend, although




In any application of the power of eminent domain, claims of its
abuse will inevitably arise. Within the context of urban redevelop-
ment, property owners have charged municipalities with unreasona-
ble delays in instituting proceedings, thus allowing "doomed"
properties to decline drastically in value before condemnation and
compensation.55 Properties falling within an area declared blighted
by the city are especially susceptible to tenant loss, police and other
public service decline, vandalism, and severely limited
marketability. 56
In many instances, land owners have brought inverse condemna-
tion actions57 to halt municipal redevelopment, with varying degrees
52. 18 Cal.3d at 277, 555 P.2d at 1103, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
53. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33320.2 (Deering Supp. 1981).
54. Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339, 1344 (Utah,
1979) (substantial compliance with statutes notice requirement held insufficient);
Yonkers Community Dev. Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478, 335 N.E.2d 327, 373
N.Y.S.2d 112 (1975) (more evidence of existence of substandard conditions required
than agency's bare assertion).
55. See generally Note, Inverse Condemnation. The Casefor Diminution in Prop-
erty Value as Compensable Damage, 28 STAN. L. REv. 779 (1976).
56. Regarding the further decline of areas declared blighted the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated:
There can be no doubt that a declaration of blight ordinarily adversely affects the
market value of property involved. This is unfortunate because in so many in-
stances the physical taking of the property does not occur for a number of years.
In the meantime the owner can only wait for that ultimate taking; there is usually
no reasonable market otherwise open for sale of the property. Moreover, in the
interim his good housekeeping incentive generally recedes and deterioration of
the building sets in.
Lyons v. City of Camden, 52 N.J. 89, 99, 243 A.2d 817, 822 (1968).
57. A "de facto" taking occurs where the landowner is so deprived of the use and
enjoyment of his property, through physical invasion or other governmental action,
that his property is said to have been taken for public use, despite the lack of formal
[Vol. 23:423
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of success.5" While the mere declaration of blight does not constitute
a compensable taking of private property under the fifth amend-
ment,5 courts have granted relief for additional renewal efforts by
local governments short of actual occupancy. In Garland v. City of
Saint Louis,6' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
versed a lower court ruling dismissing a claim for relief where no
physical invasion or appropriation of property had occurred.6" The
court cited with approval62 a 1964 Sixth Circuit case6 3 awarding com-
pensation to plaintiffs whose property was within an area declared
blighted by the city and subjected to extensive redevelopment-related
interference.' The Eighth Circuit distinguished65 later Sixth Circuit
cases66 which denied relief to claimants whose properties were
merely adjacent to the area designated for later acquisition. Thus,
blight designation, insufficient alone to constitute a taking, may be
compensable when accompanied by substantial interference with use
and enjoyment of the property.
Many state courts have tended toward more limited forms of relief
eminent domain proceedings. The landowner may file suit to compel inverse con-
demnation, in effect forcing the governmental body to formally condemn the property
and pay just compensation. See generally D. MANDELKER, INVERSE CONDEMNA-
TION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY (1964); Stubbs, In-
verse Eminent Domain Resulting From Governmental Action, in 1978 PLANNING,
ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN INSTITUTE 437 (S.W. Legal Foundation).
58. For a collection of recent decisions and their holdings or inverse condemna-
tion see 3A P. ROHAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, pt. 2, 14-19.12 (Supp. 1980).
59. Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 286 (1939).
60. 596 F.2d 784 (8th Cir. 1979).
61. 450 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
62. 596 F.2d at 788.
63. Foster v. Herley, 330 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1964).
64. Municipal action taken in accordance with the city's redevelopment plan,
which was later abandoned, included informing claimant he would receive no com-
pensation for improvements made prior to condenination; refusing to issue a building
permit until claimant signed a waiver for damage claims; condemning and clearing
several square blocks in the area; keeping a notice of lis pendens in effect for five
years after informing those who inquired that claimant's property would soon be con-
demned. Id. at 88.
65. 596 F.2d at 788-89.
66. Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
837 (1974) (no taking where no evidence of city's intent to condemn plaintiff's prop-
erty in near future); Woodlawn Mkt. Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland, 426 F.2d 955
(6th Cir. 1970) (court cannot infer a legislative intent to take property adjacent to but
outside boundaries established).
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in redevelopment cases, authorizing eminent domain awards com-
mensurate with land values before rapid pre-condemnation decline,67
but only if and when the city formally institutes eminent domain pro-
ceedings." This approach adequately compensates property owners
whose land the city has acquired after extensive delay, while permit-
ting cities to drop redevelopment plans without liability, even after
authorizing blight declarations.6 9
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of innovative redevelopment
techniques is the question of municipal liability for acts of its private
sector partner. In 1979, the Eighth Circuit ruled in Young v. Harris
70
that residents evicted by private redevelopment corporations using
the city's power of eminent domain7' were not eligible for benefits
under the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisitions Act of 1970.72 This act provides that persons displaced
by a federal agency or a state or local agency receiving federal
financial assistance must receive compensation for relocation costs
caused by public projects.73 The Eighth Circuit, construing the stat-
67. New Jersey sets the date of valuation at the date of the declaration of blight.
Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Kugler, 111 N.J. Super. 50, 267 A.2d 64 (App.
Div. 1970). Other states use the date of legislative approval of the redevelopment
plan. See, e.g., Freeman v. Paterson Redevelopment Agency, 128 N.J. Super. 448,
320 A.2d 228 (1974); Pearsall v. Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 218
Va. 892, 242 S.E.2d 228 (1978); Maxey v. Redevelopment Auth., 94 Wis.2d 375, 288
N.W.2d 794 (1980).
68. See Freeman v. Paterson Redevelopment Agency, 128 N.J. Super. 448, 455,
320 A.2d 228, 232 (1974) for a listing of cases providing for pre-condemnation value
diminution but denying inverse condemnation.
69. Allowing municipalities the flexibility to drop redevelopment plans with no
liability for compensation ignores injuries suffered by property owners in these areas.
In Freeman v. Paterson Redevelopment Agency, 128 N.J. Super. 448, 320 A.2d 228
(1974), plaintiffs land was declared blighted, and a redevelopment plan adopted by
the redevelopment agency ten years prior to the suit. During this time plaintiff exper-
ienced tenant loss, and prospective tenants were told by the Agency that the property
would be condemned within the year. Id. at 451-52, 320 A.2d at 230. Finally, plain-
tiff was informed that redevelopment efforts in his area were being postponed indefi-
nitely. Id. In denying plaintiffs claims for damages or compelled condemnation, the
court held that absent physical invasion or appropriation of property no relief could
be provided unless and until the city formally condemned the property. Id. at 456,
320 A.2d at 232.
70. 599 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979).
71. This delegation of power was performed under Missouri's Chapter 353. See
notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1976).
73. Id. § 4621 (1976).
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ute narrowly, found that the redevelopment corporation was neither
a government agency,74 nor were its activities "sufficiently inter-
twined [with those of the city] to characterize them as one project
undertaken by a state instrumentality."75 The court stressed the cor-
poration's private ownership and financing76 in finding that mere use
of the government's condemnation power is insufficient to qualify as
a government agency under the Act."
7
More startling, however, is a federal district court's recent ruling
that municipalities need not pay compensation for successful inverse
condemnation claims arising from actions of a private redevelopment
corporation.7" In the Eighth Circuit case of Garland v. City of Saint
LoUiS,79 discussed earlier,8" the court held that a redeveloper's
precondemnation activities could so impair plaintiffs beneficial use
of his land, even absent physical appropriation, that a de facto taking
could occur,8 and remanded the case, inter alia, for a determination
of municipal liability.8" On remand, the district court relied on the
Young v. Harris holding--that use of eminent domain was insuffi-
cient to turn a private corporation into a public agency-to bar impu-
tation of liability from the corporation to the city.83 The court
explained that the corporation/city relationship was neither one of
agency84 nor of independent contractor/principal.85 They were
74. 599 F.2d at 877.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. In a concurring opinion to Young Y. Harris, Judge McMillian expressed regret
over the limitations of the Act:
As the majority discussed, the legislative history of [the Act] indicates that Con-
gress did not intend this Act to apply to relocations effectuated by private devel-
opers, even though these developers may be assisted financially by the federal
government. In light of the recent trend in government programs of enticing
private enterprise to undertake endeavors once assumed solely by governmental
entities, I question whether the original scope of [the Act] is still appropriate.
Id. at 880 (McMillian, J., concurring). See generally Comment, The Uniform Reloca-
tion Act. Eligibility Requirementsfor Relocation Benefits-Young v. Harris, 19 URBAN
L. ANN. 207 (1980).
78. Garland v. City of St. Louis, 492 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
79. 596 F.2d 784 (8th Cir. 1979).
80. See notes 60-66 and accompanying text supra.
81. 596 F.2d at 787.
82. Id. at 789.
83. 492 F. Supp. at 404-05.
84. Id.
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merely separate, cooperating entities working toward a mutually ben-
eficial goal. 6
The district court's application of the Young v. Harris rationale to
the constitutional requirement of compensation for public takings of
private land is inappropriate. The Young court considered the corpo-
ration's use of the eminent domain power as relevant to but not de-
terminative of the condemnor's status as a governmental agency
under the relocation assistance statute.87 The right to compensation
for public use of private land, however, flows not from the public or
private status of the condemnors, but from the exercise of the con-
demnation power itself.88 For a municipality to argue that a public
purpose justifies the delegation of its eminent domain authority to a
private corporation,89 while disclaiming the constitutional duty to
compensate dispossessed land owners because the private condemnor
is only acting in "furtherance of its own profit-motivated objec-
tives"90 seems conveniently inconsistent. The fifth amendment de-mands that just compensation be paid upon a taking of private land
for public use, and if a taking has occurred, either by formal proceed-
ing or de facto appropriation, then compensation is due.
IV. CONCLUSION
Redevelopment legislation authorizing public/private alliances
and tax abatements will become increasingly important municipal
tools against inner-city deterioration. Neither incidental benefit nor
detriment to private interests will invalidate the use of eminent do-
main for land acquisition and clearance. Judicial deference toward
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 599 F.2d at 876-77.
88. ".... nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. By using the passive voice, the framers imply that
the identity of the agent is irrelevant. A plain meaning interpretation would require
compensation for any public purpose taking. Cf. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269,
277 (1898) (compensation due when private property taken "by a state or under its
authority for public use") (emphasis added).
89. Annbar v. Westside Redevelopment Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1965).
90. Garland v. City of St. Louis, 492 F. Supp. 402, 404 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
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legislative determinations of the means necessary to accomplish rede-
velopment is likely to continue.
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